Quantum computing hardware scene illustrating post-quantum cryptography planning

Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration: Inventory, Agility and the Official Timelines

A practical order of work for a post-quantum cryptography migration, from cryptographic inventory and crypto-agility to hybrid key exchange and vendor commitments, set against the NIST, US federal and UK NCSC timelines.

By Shayan Salehi 7 min read

Image: ColdAI

A post-quantum cryptography migration should run in a fixed order: build a cryptographic inventory, make your systems able to swap algorithms, move key exchange first (using hybrid modes where they are justified), then signatures, while holding vendors to dates. The anchor is NIST IR 8547, finalized on October 27, 2026, which deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035.

What is standardized, and what changed this year

NIST published its first three post-quantum standards on August 13, 2024. FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM, a key-encapsulation mechanism with three parameter sets (ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024). FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA, a lattice-based digital signature algorithm. FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature scheme derived from SPHINCS+. NIST's FIPS 203 page also records a planning update dated November 17, 2025, saying an issue will be corrected in a future revision, so build version tracking into your plan.

Three things have moved since. In October 2026 NIST finalized IR 8547, "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards," which replaced a draft first posted on November 12, 2024. In August 2026 the IETF published RFC 10024, a Proposed Standard that defines hybrid key agreement for TLS 1.3 and names three groups: X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024. And on January 23, 2026, CISA published its list of product categories where post-quantum products are available.

The practical meaning is that the standards, the protocol specifications and the buying guidance now exist. What most organizations lack is a map of where their own cryptography lives.

The official timelines, and who they bind

Several dates circulate, and they come from different bodies with different reach.

  • NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026): NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow its use under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. The tables cover ECDSA, EdDSA and RSA signatures, and finite-field and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and RSA key establishment.
  • US federal deadlines: IR 8547 states that Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15 require federal high-value assets and high-impact systems to adopt post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by December 31, 2030, and for digital signatures by December 31, 2031. National Security Memorandum 10 set 2035 as the target for completing the federal migration. The report also says agencies must support TLS 1.3 by January 2, 2030.
  • UK NCSC: its guidance on migration timelines sets three milestones. By 2028, define migration goals, complete discovery and assessment, and build an initial plan. By 2031, complete the highest-priority migration activities. By 2035, complete migration of all systems, services and products.

The federal dates bind federal agencies. They do not bind a private company directly. They still matter for planning, because federal agencies are large buyers whose deadlines are likely to create demand for post-quantum products, and because IR 8547 notes that previous cryptographic transitions took 10 to 20 years, which leaves little margin against a 2030 or 2035 date. The NIST report is explicit about urgency: it says organizations should begin with cryptographic inventories, migration planning and early deployments.

The threat that drives the early dates is "harvest now, decrypt later." IR 8547 describes adversaries collecting encrypted data today to decrypt once quantum technology matures. That is why key establishment moves before signatures: data that must stay confidential for many years is exposed now, while a forged signature requires a quantum computer to exist at the time of the attack.

Step 1: Build a cryptographic inventory

You cannot plan a migration without knowing what you are migrating. The NCSC puts discovery first and gives a useful scope: map the services, data, protocols and hardware that depend on cryptography, including how long the data must stay protected and how valuable it is to an attacker. It adds that this is not intended to be a formal asset register. The aim is understanding of each system and its dependencies, with version and patch information recorded where available.

CISA reflects the same priority for federal agencies. It describes a requirement under 6 U.S.C. 1526 for each agency to keep a current inventory of IT vulnerable to quantum decryption, and a strategy for moving to automated cryptographic discovery and inventory tools.

For each entry, record at least:

  • The algorithm and key size in use, such as RSA-2048, ECDSA P-256 or ECDH.
  • Where it runs: TLS endpoints, VPNs, code signing, certificate authorities, databases, message queues, hardware security modules, embedded devices.
  • Who owns it: your code, a vendor's product, or a cloud service you configure but do not control.
  • Data lifetime: how many years the protected data must stay confidential or the signature must stay valid.
  • Replaceability: whether you can change the algorithm by configuration, by software update, or only by replacing hardware.

Sort the result by data lifetime and replaceability. Long-lived confidential data on hard-to-replace systems comes first.

Step 2: Make systems crypto-agile

IR 8547 says a smooth transition requires building long-term cryptographic agility into organizational infrastructure so that updates can follow as post-quantum standards evolve. The NCSC makes the same point for buyers: because traditional and post-quantum algorithms will run side by side during migration, you should seek solutions that offer cryptographic agility.

In engineering terms, agility means that changing an algorithm is a configuration or library change, not a redesign. Applications call a central cryptographic service instead of embedding algorithm choices. Certificate and key lifecycles are automated so that reissuing at scale is routine. Protocols negotiate algorithms rather than hard-coding them. Hardware roots of trust are checked for firmware upgrade paths.

IR 8547 also gives a direct instruction for systems that cannot change: those that cannot support post-quantum cryptography should be identified and prioritized for replacement or decommissioning. Put that list in front of your budget owners early, because hardware refresh cycles are long.

Step 3: Use hybrid key exchange deliberately

A hybrid scheme combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum one so that the result stays secure if either component holds. IR 8547 describes hybrids as a hedge against a cryptographic or implementation flaw in one component, and as a path where sector requirements still call for classical algorithms. It also warns that hybrids add complexity and cost, are typically expected to be temporary, and may lead to a second transition to PQC-only. NIST leaves the choice to each application and says it will accommodate hybrid key establishment and dual signatures in FIPS 140 validation.

The NCSC notes that browsers already use hybrid key exchange combining traditional methods with ML-KEM, and that the exact mechanism may still change. RFC 10024 now gives TLS 1.3 a standards-track definition.

A workable policy is to use hybrid key exchange on externally exposed and long-lived-data channels where your vendors support it, and to avoid building custom hybrid constructions. The NCSC advises against writing your own post-quantum implementations and recommends certified implementations and trusted libraries. Plan for testing, because new handshake behavior can interact with network devices and monitoring tools.

Step 4: Manage vendor dependencies

Most of your migration will be delivered by someone else. The NCSC states that where you rely on commodity platforms, upgrades to post-quantum cryptography are likely to be delivered by your service provider, and that organizations using managed service providers should confirm those providers are doing the same assessment. It recommends telling suppliers your requirements early and suggests publishing a statement of intent to signal demand.

CISA's product category list of January 23, 2026 helps you judge where the market stands. It identifies cloud services (PaaS and IaaS), web software such as browsers and web servers, some collaboration software and some endpoint security as widely available categories, and says organizations should acquire only PQC-capable products when planning acquisitions in those categories. Many other categories, including networking hardware, identity and access management, and databases, are listed as in transition. CISA notes that widely available categories mostly use PQC for key establishment but not yet for signatures, and that operational technology and IoT devices are excluded from the lists.

On November 5, 2026, CISA published joint guidance with the Australian Cyber Security Centre and the NSA titled "Post Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors." It frames the questions around whether a vendor understands quantum-related risk, is transparent about its cryptographic implementations, and supports a secure, cost-effective and timely transition. Use it as the base for your vendor questionnaire.

Build these items into contracts and renewals:

  • A dated roadmap for supporting ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, with the specific FIPS versions referenced.
  • Disclosure of the cryptographic libraries and algorithms in the product.
  • A commitment to deliver post-quantum updates without a forced replacement of hardware you bought recently.
  • Notice periods for algorithm changes that could affect interoperability.

Where to start

Begin with work that is useful whatever the final timeline turns out to be.

  1. Name an owner and set a date. The NCSC's 2028 milestone for discovery, assessment and an initial plan is a reasonable target for organizations without a sector deadline.
  2. Run a first-pass inventory of internet-facing TLS, VPNs, code signing and certificate authorities, then extend to internal systems and embedded devices.
  3. Classify data by required confidentiality lifetime, and flag anything that must stay secret past 2035.
  4. Send a vendor letter to your top 20 suppliers by cryptographic exposure, using the CISA and ACSC questions.
  5. Pilot hybrid key exchange on one external endpoint, measure handshake behavior and monitoring effects, and write down what broke.
  6. Add algorithm replaceability as a requirement in every new procurement and architecture review.

Work in this order: inventory first, agility second, and a vendor-by-vendor view of who must deliver what by which date. The inventory takes time, and it is the one piece of the program that nobody else can do for you.

Tags:post-quantum-cryptographycryptographic-inventorycrypto-agilityhybrid-key-exchangeml-kemnist-ir-8547vendor-risk

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